








The Health Impact Fund: More justice 
and efficiency in global health 
Thomas Pogge 
Abstract 
Some 18 million people die annually from poverty-related causes. Many more 
are suffering grievously from treatable medical conditions. These burdens can be 
substantially  reduced  by  supplementing  the  rules  governing  pharmaceutical 
innovation. Established by the World Trade Organization’s TRIPS Agreement, 
these rules cause advanced medicines to be priced beyond the reach of the poor 
and steer medical research away from diseases concentrated among them. We 
should complement these rules with the Health Impact Fund. Financed by many 
governments,  the  HIF  would  offer  any  new  pharmaceutical  product  the 
opportunity to participate, during its first ten years, in the HIF’s annual reward 
pools, receiving a share equal to its share of the assessed global health impact of 
all HIF-registered products. In exchange, the innovator would have to agree to 
make  this  product  available  worldwide  at  the  lowest  feasible  cost  of 
manufacture. Fully consistent with TRIPS, the HIF achieves three key advances. It 
directs  some  pharmaceutical  innovation  toward  the  most  serious  diseases, 
including  those  concentrated  among  the  poor.  It  makes  all  HIF-registered 
medicines cheaply available to all. And it incentivizes innovators to promote the 
optimal use of their HIF-registered medicines. Magnifying one another’s effects, 
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1. Introduction 
Part of the WTO Treaty, the TRIPS Agreement entitles pharmaceutical firms to 
protect  their  innovations  with  product  patents,1  which  suppress  generic 
competition, and then to sell their patented medicines at prices far above the 
cost of production. By pressing less developed countries to institute and enforce 
stronger  patent  protections,  t he  wealthier  countries  enabled  their 
pharmaceutical firms to profit from sales to the more affluent people in the 
developing world. As a side effect of this success, poor people are now excluded 
from  many  advanced  medicines  which,  without  TRIPS,  would  have   been 
immediately available to them as cheap generics. In order to make sure that 
affluent people in the developing world contribute to the cost of pharmaceutical 
research and development (R&D), TRIPS causes grave harms and deaths among 
poor people in the  developing world who cannot afford the large mark -ups 
charged on patented medicines. 
Some defenders of the TRIPS regime contend that it is natural and not unfair that 
affluent people have all kinds of expensive things that poor people cannot afford 
to buy. But this contention assumes that the existing distribution of income and 
wealth is fair. This assumption is highly problematic. Today, at least 80  percent 
of global income variability is explained by a person’s initial country and class 
(Milanovic 2009). Affecting human beings from the moment of conception, these 
(dis)advantages  are  obviously  undeserved.  And  their  magnitude  has  become 
extreme in the course of a long history pervaded by massive crimes such as 
slavery, colonialism, and genocide. Today, the bottom two-thirds of humankind 
have about four percent of global private wealth (Credit Suisse 2010; Shorrocks 
& Davies 2010, p. 3) and six percent of global household income. Average income 
in the top five percent of humanity is 9.3 times the global average, while average 
                                                 
1  Product  patents  allow  the  patent  holder  to  veto  the  manufacture  and  sale  of  a  patented 
molecule regardless of how it is produced. Before TRIPS, India granted only process patents, 
which allow the patent holder to veto merely a specific way of making a molecule (see: WHO, 
2011). India is the leading supplier of medicines in the less developed countries. 2 
 
income in the bottom quarter is 1/32 of the global average. So, one person in the 
top five percent has as much income, on average, as 300 people in the bottom 
quarter.2 
A second, independent problem with the mentioned defense of TRIPS is that new 
medicines are not expensive to manufacture. Their high prices are “artificial” in 
the  sense  that  they  are  enabled  by  patents.  The  question  is  not  whether we 
should  subsidize  advanced  medicines  for  the  poor.  Rather,  the  question  is 
whether we may promote the enforcement of temporary monopolies that drive 
up  the  prices  at  which  they  can  buy  such  medicines.  This  is  what  our 
governments  have  done  in  our  name  by  insisting  that  innovators  must  be 
enabled,  even  in  the  less  developed  countries,  to  outlaw  and  suppress  the 
manufacture  and  sale  of  generic  versions  of  “their”  product  at  competitive 
market prices. In defense of this practice it has been argued that the manufacture 
and sale of generic products are moral crimes that any just legal system ought to 
suppress.  But  the  defenders  of  this  view  have  not  managed  to  provide  a 
convincing argument  to show why the fact  that  one person  has made a new 
product should give her a natural right to bar others from making a like product 
out of their own raw materials.3  
2. A matter of incentives 
In view of the difficulty of formulating a convincing natural-law argument, most 
defenders of TRIPS resort to pragmatic arguments that appeal to the need for 
economic  incentives.  Pharmaceutical  R&D  is  expensive  and  would  not  be 
sustainable  if  innovators  could  not  make  a  decent  profit  on  their  successful 
innovations.  Therefore  the  prospect  of  hefty  mark-ups,  at  least  for  a  certain 
period,  is  necessary  for  stimulating  the  introduction  of  new  medicines.  Such 
mark-ups  require  blocking  access  to  cheap  generic  copies  of  advanced 
medicines. 
                                                 
2 The income data used here were kindly supplied by Branko Milanovic, Lead Economist in the 
World Bank’s Research Department, in a personal e-mail communication of 25 April 2010, on file 
with the author. Milanovic is the leading authority on the measurement of economic inequality, 
and  his  published  work  contains  similar  albeit  somewhat  less  updated  information  (see 
Milanovic 2002; Milanovic 2005; Milanovic 2011). 
3 And, if there were such a right, does it last exactly as long as the local patent law protects it? For 
a more detailed discussion (see Hollis & Pogge 2008, ch. 6). 3 
 
Despite its popularity, this pragmatic reasoning fails for the simple reason that 
the introduction of important new medicines can be adequately incentivized and 
rewarded without mark-ups harmful to the poor. Diverse such mechanisms have 
been discussed in the last decade, at the World Health Organization and in other 
forums.  Let  us  here  focus  on  one  such  mechanism  that  would  dramatically 
improve health outcomes for humankind — not by spending even more money 
on  medicines,  but  by  changing  the  incentive  structure  in  a  way  that  more 
equitable and just outcomes are produced. Conceived and critically tested by an 
international  and  interdisciplinary  team  of  experts,  the  Health  Impact  Fund 
(HIF) holds out the prospect of massive global health improvements at a net cost 
that is negligible or even negative. 
3. What is the Health Impact Fund? 
Financed mainly by governments, the HIF is a proposed pay-for-performance 
mechanism that would offer innovators the option — no obligation — to register 
any new medicine or, under certain conditions, also a traditional medicine or a 
new  use  of  an  existing  medicine.  By  registering  a  product  at  the  time  of 
marketing approval, the innovator would undertake to make it available, during 
its first 10 years on the market, wherever it is needed at no more than the lowest 
feasible cost of production and distribution. The innovator would further commit 
to allowing, at  no charge, generic  production and distribution  of the product 
after this decade has ended (if the innovator still has unexpired patents on the 
product).  In  exchange,  the  registrant  would  receive,  during  those  ten  years, 
annual reward payments  based on  its product’s health impact.4 Each reward 
payment would be part of a large a nnual pay-out — initially perhaps around 
AUD 6 billion — with every registered product receiving a share equal to its 
share of the assessed health impact of all HIF-registered products in the relevant 
                                                 
4 Health impact can be measured in quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) saved. Giving a patient an 
additional year in good health is worth one QALY. Appropriate fractions of QALYs are awarded 
for additional years in less than good health and also for life years in which patients are in better 
health than would otherwise have been the case. QALY awards for periods longer or shorter than 
a year are proportionately adjusted. The QALY metric has been refined over the last 20 years and 
is  already  extensively  used  in  many  contexts,  including  by  public  and  private  insurers  for 
deciding which new drugs to cover. 4 
 
year. If the HIF were found to work well, its annual reward pools could be scaled 
up to attract an increasing share of new medicines. 
The HIF would greatly mitigate the greatest injustice of the present system by 
limiting  the  price  of  any  registered  medicine  to  the  lowest  feasible  cost  of 
production and distribution. This price ceiling would enable the poor majority of 
humankind to gain immediate access to the fruits of pharmaceutical innovation 
— either through their own funds or through national health systems, NGOs, 
international agencies, or insurance programs (all of which would be able to 
serve more patients more cheaply thanks to much lower medicine prices). In 
addition, the HIF would foster the development of new high-impact medicines 
against diseases concentrated among the poor. Pharmaceutical innovators are 
now neglecting such diseases because they have no realistic hope of recovering 
their R&D costs from sales to the poor. As a further bonus, the HIF would also 
motivate registrants to ensure that their products are widely available, perhaps 
even  below  the  price  ceiling,  and  that  they  are  competently  prescribed  and 
optimally  used.5  Registrants would be rewarded not for merely selling their 
products, but for making them effective toward improving global health. 
If some pharmaceutical R&D were financed thr ough HIF rewards, most of the 
cost would be borne by affluent populations and people — just like today. But by 
funding innovation through health impact rewards rather than through patent-
protected mark-ups, we affluent avoid the need to exclude the poor. Including 
the  poor  in  this  way  costs  us  nothing  because  the  cost  of  manufacturing 
additional doses is covered by the price. The expansion of production may even 
benefit us through lower unit costs as well as through generally improved global 
health.  The  HIF  would  benefit  us  affluent  also  by  changing  profoundly  the 
marketing and promotion of new medicines. The HIF would pay nothing for the 
creation  or promotion of a “me-too” product that  merely takes market  share 
from a competitor’s earlier no-less-effective medicine. And even with a highly 
superior product, a HIF registrant would make no profit from the sale of its 
                                                 
5 A registrant would want to offer its product to poor populations below cost if and insofar as the 
additional health impact rewards due to reaching additional poor patients are expected to be 
larger than the loss on the sales price. And a registrant would want to promote the wide and 
proper use of its product (esp. by those who can benefit the most from it) if and insofar as the 
additional health impact rewards due to such efforts outweigh their costs. 5 
 
medicine as such, but would profit only insofar as this medicine were actually 
made effective toward improving patient health. Thanks to this new incentive, all 
patients would be more likely to receive medicines that will actually improve 
their condition. 
4. The Global Fund, UNITAID, Compulsory Licensing and AMCs – 
What is the added value of the HIF? 
The  initiative  for  and  design  of  the  HIF  owe  much  to  other  global  health 
initiatives, such as the Global Fund, the patent pool initiated by UNITAID, and 
advance market commitments. The HIF would nonetheless play a unique role 
that  cannot  be  filled  as  well  by  these  other  approaches.  The  four  initiatives 
mentioned  all  fit  the  label  “development  aid”:  predominantly  funded  by  the 
affluent, they are designed to benefit poor populations. By contrast, the HIF is 
jointly funded by rich and poor countries, with each funding partner contributing 
according  to  its  gross  national  product.  The  HIF  also  benefits  rich  and  poor 
populations alike through lower drug prices and much greater efforts toward 
ensuring that medicines are directed to the right patients and used to optimal 
effect. 
While the Global Fund supports large purchases of medicines, it does not aim to 
incentivize innovation. One might say that its purchases do have an incentive 
effect: innovators can now expect that, if they develop a high-impact medicine 
for AIDS, TB or malaria, they will earn money from mark-ups on sales supported 
by the Global Fund in behalf of poor patients. This is true, but the HIF provides 
more suitable incentives because its funding is locked in for a longer time period 
and also because it offers rewards based not on how much a new product can 
achieve but on how much more it can achieve than the current standard of care 
enjoyed  by  the  various  patient  groups.  The  present  system  provides  large 
rewards to a new medicine that is only slightly better than the treatment that 
patients would otherwise have had: as buyers (including the Global Fund) switch 
over to the better medicine, this medicine now comes to earn the entire mark-up. 
The  HIF  would  reward  a  new  medicine  only  for  the  improvement  it  brings 
relative to the treatment that patients would otherwise have had. In this way, the 6 
 
HIF incentivizes innovators to concentrate their efforts to where they can realize 
the largest incremental health benefits. This is not a criticism of the Global Fund, 
which was not designed as an innovation mechanism. But it shows how the HIF 
usefully  complements  the  Global  Fund  by  rewarding  more  accurately  the 
innovation component of new drugs. The Global Fund can then purchase these 
new drugs without any mark-up. In designing the HIF, we have worked closely 
with the Global Fund, which is ready to host the HIF in Geneva much like it is 
now hosting the Medicines for Malaria Venture.  
UNITAID  has  created  a  patent  pool  intended  to  facilitate  licensing  by 
pharmaceutical  innovators  to  generic  firms,  initially  limited  to  HIV/AIDS 
medicines in specified developing countries and improving access to existing or 
slightly modified HIV/AIDS treatments.  So far, this improvement has typically 
been tightly limited, excluding the populations of many low- and middle-income 
countries. The benefits of this pool are likely, over time, to be extended to more 
countries and more therapies. But the patent pool does not (and is not meant to) 
stimulate pharmaceutical R&D and therefore does not obviate the need for the 
HIF. Conversely, the HIF does not obviate the need for the patent pool: even with 
the HIF  in operation, UNITAID’s patent pool would continue to be useful for 
facilitating  access  by  poor  people  to  HIF-unregistered  products,  including 
combination therapies. 
Similar  points  apply  to  compulsory  licensing  as  provided  for  in  the  TRIPS 
Agreement as clarified in the Doha Declaration.6  The TRIPS Agreement permits a 
government  to  compel  a  patent  holder  to  license  a  domestic  company  to 
manufacture and sell its medicine, in exchange for a (ty pically small) licensing 
fee that is set by the government and paid by the generic manufacturer to the 
patent holder. The point of compulsory licenses is to enable governments to 
make  important  new  medicines  accessible  to  their  populations.  Although 
compulsory licenses are perfectly legal, they have been issued only rarely  — 
mainly because pharmaceutical companies lobby strongly against them, often by 
calling upon the support of agencies of their own government (e.g. the office of 
                                                 
6 See Article 31 of the 1995 TRIPS Agreement (www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/27-
trips_04c_e.htm) and the 2001 Doha Declaration 
(www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min01_e/mindecl_trips_e.htm). 7 
 
the US Trade Representative, which can inflict serious penalties upon countries 
deemed  to  be  hostile  to  US  economic  interests  presented  as  free  trade 
principles).  Compulsory  licenses  have  given  poor  patients  access  to  urgently 
needed medicines; and they might come to do so on a much grander scale if less-
developed  countries  were  to  combine  more  effectively  against  political  and 
economic  pressures  from  the  leading  pharmaceutical  innovator  states.  But 
compulsory  licenses  do  have  a  dampening  effect  on  innovation  by  creating 
uncertainty about the extent to which successful innovators will be allowed to 
profit from their successes. Unlike the HIF, compulsory licenses cannot stimulate 
innovation (especially against the diseases of the poor), nor can they provide 
incentives to market and promote medicines for optimal health impact. Even if 
compulsory licenses were deployed in the best  possible way, they would not 
undermine the need for the HIF. 
A  leading  species  of  innovation  prize,  Advance  Market  Commitments  (AMCs) 
assure profitable sales to developers of a pre-defined vaccine or other medicine. 
An AMC may legally guarantee, for example, that the first 200 million doses of a 
new kind of vaccine – if they meet certain specific requirements and are sold into 
less developed countries at $3 a dose – are rewarded with an additional subsidy 
of $15 per dose. The described AMC would incentivize innovator firms to work 
hard  to  collect  as  much  of  the  $3  billion  prize  as  possible:  by  developing  a 
qualifying vaccine more quickly than its competitors and by selling doses of it 
sooner and faster into the developing world. Though AMCs are more similar to 
the HIF than the other three mechanisms, they have five significant draw-backs: 
1.  Each  innovation  prize  targets  a  specific  disease,  which  is  chosen  by 
politicians, bureaucrats, or experts — presumably with an eye to selecting 
that  disease  against  which  the  most  cost-effective  health  gains  can  be 
achieved.  The  HIF  would  let  each  innovator  company  decide  which 
disease(s) to target. The latter design is superior because insiders have 
proprietary information that gives them a much better understanding of 
how they can reduce the global burden of disease most cost-effectively. 
Insiders also have powerful incentives to get it right: if they do well in 
selecting research targets, they will end up with products that will bring 8 
 
large  therapeutic  benefits  and  hence  large  health  impact  rewards. 
Innovation  prize  designers  lack  such  incentives:  they  lose  nothing  by 
selecting  an  inferior  research  target,  and  lobbying  by  companies  and 
patient groups may then easily lead them to do just that. 
2.  Funding of innovation prizes depends on donor willingness, which can 
easily  dry  up  because  the  renewals  will  be  for  different  diseases. 
Guaranteeing annual reward pools far into the future, the HIF would be a 
permanent source of pharmaceutical innovation, supporting some 20-30 
products at any given time (with 2-3 added and expiring each year). But 
this advantage comes at a cost: establishing the HIF in the first place is 
much harder than getting funding for an innovation prize.  
3.  Innovation  prizes  must  specify  rather  precisely  what  is  to  count  as  a 
qualifying innovation. But such a precise “finish line” is difficult to specify 
optimally in advance of the research that the prize is yet to encourage. 
Suboptimal specification may lead to no qualifying innovation (with much 
wasted effort) or to qualifying products that, with a little extra effort, 
could  have  been  substantially  better.  The  HIF  need  issue  no  advance 
specifications — it simply rewards each registered product according to 
its health impact. 
4.  An innovation prize must fix the size of the reward — in the case of an 
AMC,  the  size  of  the  subsidy.  Since  innovators  have  every  reason  to 
conceal and exaggerate the true cost of their R&D, there is a substantial 
likelihood that an innovation prize, if it motivates successful innovation 
efforts  at  all,  will  pay  more  than  would  have  been  necessary,  thereby 
producing  a  windfall  profit  for  innovators.  HIF  rewards  would,  by 
contrast, be paid as a self-adjusting rate that reflects innovators’ own and 
accurate assessment of their R&D costs.7 A reward rate perceived as rich 
would decline as a result of eliciting additional HIF-registrations of newly 
approved drugs; and a reward rate perceived as puny would increase as a 
result of discouraging some new HIF -registrations. Such self-adjustment 
                                                 
7 This rate might be expressed as a monetary amount per QALY saved. 9 
 
assures taxpayers that their funds are spent efficiently while also assuring 
firms that they will earn a decent return on their HIF-registered products. 
5.  An AMC gives any successful innovator strong incentives quickly to sell 
doses eligible for the subsidy but no reason to care about what happens to 
these  doses  beyond  the  point  of  sale.  The  innovator’s  earnings  are 
unaffected if some of the sold product is never used, loses its efficacy, is 
taken by patients who do not benefit from (or are even harmed by) it, or 
is  consumed  without  adherence  to  the  proper  protocol.  The  HIF,  by 
contrast,  would  pay  according  to  the  product’s  actual  health  impact, 
thereby  incentivizing  the  innovator  to  take  all  cost-effective  measures 
toward maximizing this impact: to safeguard freshness, to ensure supply 
to  patients  who  benefit  the  most,  to  instruct  medical  personnel  and 
patients in how the product is to be taken for optimal effect. 
While  AMCs  can  work  better  than  simpler  innovation  prizes,  especially  in 
stimulating the development of new vaccines, the HIF can be much more cost-
effective in terms of its impact on patient health.  
5. What are the origins of the HIF proposal? 
Many people have contributed intellectually and in many practical ways to the 
development  of  the  HIF  proposal.  The  proposal  continues  to  be  explored, 
improved and refined by the thoughtful suggestions and criticisms of people of 
various backgrounds. The main way stations that brought the HIF proposal to its 
present form might be summed up as follows: 
1.  Abramowicz (2003) first developed a proposal for a reward system with a 
fixed fund, in which rewards would be based on the proportion of social 
value created by the innovation, as assessed after the innovation has been 
commercialized. He considered the possibility that such a system could be 
(a)  mandatory  and  universal  or  (b)  optional.  Rewards  were  to  be 
conditional  on  the  patentee  renouncing  patent  rights.  Abramowicz’s 
lengthy  paper  (122  pages)  built  extensively  on  a  2001  working  paper 
version and analysis of other proposals for prizes for innovation.  10 
 
2.  Love (2003) and Hubbard & Love (2004) proposed the creation of such a 
mandatory, universal fund with prizes limited to pharmaceuticals (as in 
Guell & Fischbaum 1995). 
3.  Hollis (2004) proposed that social value in such a prize mechanism to be 
measured  in  QALYs  or  DALYs,  much  like  the  approach  taken  by  the 
National  Institute  of  Health  and  Clinical  Excellence  in  the  UK  and  the 
Australian Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme.  
4.  Love  (2004)  proposed  that  the  period  of  prize  payments  could  be 
structured over a fixed number of years, much like US Orphan Drug Act, 
data exclusivity, etc. 
5.  Still unaware of any of this earlier work, Pogge (2005) proposed a prize 
system for drugs that would be voluntary, but without the proportional 
rewards  first  suggested  by  Abramowicz.  The  paper  characterized  the 
ethical  properties  of  such  a  system.  This  paper  was  written  during 
Pogge’s  year  (2003–04)  as  a  research  scholar  in  the  Department  of 
Clinical Bioethics at  the US National Institutes of Health and was first 
presented there and at the University of Birmingham (June 2004).  
6.  Hollis (2005) characterized the economic properties of an optional fund 
for pharmaceuticals.  
7.  Hollis & Pogge (2008) described in much greater detail a proposal for an 
optional fund, in which prices are regulated,  but  open  licensing is not 
required. This book also describes possible  approaches to many other 
issues of implementation, including determining ownership of the right to 
rewards,  governance  structures  for  the  Fund,  and  methods  for 
determining  incremental  health  benefits.  The  book  was  conceived  and 
commenced during a two-week workshop at the ANU (December 2007) 
at which the name “Health Impact Fund” was coined and in which Hafiz 
Aziz-ur-Rehman,  Christian  Barry,  Laura  Biron,  Leila  Chirayath,  Kieran 
Donaghue,  Jocelyn  Finlay,  Mike  Ravvin,  Matt  Rimmer,  and  Michael 
Selgelid were also participating. 11 
 
8.  Syed (2009) showed that the HIF mechanism need not rely on patents to 
qualify innovations for rewards. 
All  persons  involved  in  working on  the  Health  Impact  Fund  proposal  deeply 
appreciate the important contributions others have made to it. Our concern is 
not to take credit for, or ownership of these ideas, but to bring them to life for the 
benefit  of  humanity.  The  HIF  is  still  a  work  in  progress,  and  we  continue 
gratefully  to  receive  all  criticisms  and  suggestions  toward  refining  and 
improving the proposal toward its realization.  
6. Who is supporting the HIF? 
The development of the Health Impact Fund proposal has been supported by a 
ARC Discovery Grant that Pogge led with Judith Whitworth, who was then the 
Director of ANU’s John Curtin School of Medical Research; by a grant from the 
British BUPA Foundation; by the Canadian Institutes of Health Research; by Yale 
University’s MacMillan Center; and by a grant from the European Commission, 
which  funded  a  collaboration  (“Innova-P2”)  of  teams  in  seven  countries, 
including India, China, Australia and the Philippines. Many others have given 
time, thoughts and publicity to the HIF project and specifically to the registered 
NGO  Incentives  for  Global  Health  (www.incentivesforglobalhealth.org)  that  is 
now spearheading the effort to get the HIF on the international political agenda.  
IGH is supported by a very distinguished Advisory Board consisting of John J. 
DeGioia, President of Georgetown  University; Ruth Faden, the Philip Franklin 
Wagley Professor of Biomedical Ethics, Johns Hopkins University and Director of 
the  Johns  Hopkins  Berman  Institute  of  Bioethics;  Paul  Farmer,  Chair  of  the 
Department of Global Health and Social Medicine at the Harvard Medical School, 
Chief of the Division of Global Health Equity at Brigham and Women's Hospital in 
Boston, co-founder of Partners in Health, and recipient of a MacArthur Genius 
Award; Jim Yong Kim, President of Dartmouth College, former Director of the 
WHO HIV/AIDS department and co-founder of Partners in Health; Paul Martin, 
former Prime Minister of Canada; Christopher Murray, Director of the Seattle 
Institute for Health Metrics and Evaluation (IHME), former Executive Director of 
the WHO Evidence and Information for Policy Cluster and former Director of the 12 
 
Harvard  Center  for  Population  and  Development  Studies;  Baroness  Onora 
O'Neill, member of the UK House of Lords and formerly Chair of the Nuffield 
Foundation, President of the British Academy and Principal of Newnham College, 
Cambridge  University;  James  Orbinski,  Associate  Professor  of  Medicine  and 
Political Science at the University of Toronto, former International President of 
Médecins Sans Frontières, accepting the 1999 Nobel Peace Prize on behalf of 
MSF; co-founder of Drugs For Neglected Diseases Initiative (DNDi) and founder 
and Board Chair of Dignitas International; Sir Michael Rawlins, Chair of the UK 
National Institute of Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE); Karin Roth, Member 
of  the  German  Bundestag  (parliament);  Amartya  Sen,  Lamont  University 
Professor at  Harvard University, former Master of Trinity College, Cambridge 
University, and winner of the 1998 Nobel Prize in Economics; Peter Singer, Ira 
W. DeCamp Professor of Bioethics and named as one of the world's 100 most 
influential people by Time Magazine (2005); Judith Whitworth, former Director 
of The John Curtin School of Medical Research and Australian Capital Territory 
Australian  of  the  Year  for  2004;  Heidemarie  Wieczorek-Zeul,  Member  of  the 
German  Bundestag  (parliament)  and  former  Federal  Minister  for  Economic 
Cooperation and Development (1998–2009); Richard Wilder, Associate General 
Counsel  of  the  Bill  &  Melinda  Gates  Foundation,  formerly  Associate  General 
Counsel for Intellectual Property Policy at Microsoft and Director of the WIPO 
Global  Intellectual  Property  Issues  Division.  Further  details  about  IGH, 
specifically its Scientific Advisory Committee and its Management Team can be 
found at www.yale.edu/macmillan/igh/about_us.html. 
7. What next? 
To realize the enormous potential of the HIF for global health, we must overcome 
two  hurdles.  The  first  is  to  establish  a  partnership  of  countries  willing  to 
underwrite  the  HIF  through  long-term  funding  commitments.  These  are 
necessary to create stable new innovation incentives. It can take ten years or 
more for a research project to result in a new medicine approved for sale. It 
takes another ten years for the innovator firm to collect its annual health impact 
rewards for this drug. To project  its full incentive power, the funding of the 
annual HIF pools must then be guaranteed at least twenty years out. This would 13 
 
be a novelty in global health funding: currently, funders at  best  commit only 
some  three  years  into  the  future  (as  with  the  Global  Fund);  and  their 
commitments are soft, that is, statements of intent that are sometimes simply 
withdrawn (as happened recently with Germany’s contribution commitment to 
the Global Fund). 
Is  it  realistic  to  expect  governments  to  make  binding  long-term  funding 
commitments  in  global  health?  In  the  wake  of  the  global  financial  crisis, 
governments are especially concerned to spend their scarce funds efficiently. 
And they would realize, of course, that the incentive power of the HIF would be 
diminished if potential innovators discounted future rewards by the probability 
that  these  will  not  be  actually  available  for  disbursement.  Therefore,  if 
governments agree to create the HIF at all, then they are likely to back it with a 
proper treaty mechanism so as fully to reassure innovators that any successful 
efforts they make will be rewarded. The treaty would of course include an exit 
option,  but  one  that  involves  a  substantial  lead  time  as  needed  to  leave 
innovation incentives undisturbed (see Hollis & Pogge 2008, pp. 46–7). Such a 
treaty might simply commit each partner country to an annual contribution fixed 
as a percentage of its gross national income.8 If this contribution were fixed at 
0.03 percent, then countries with a combined GNI of AUD 20 trillion would be 
needed to launch the fund with the desired annual pool size of AUD 6 billion. 
We are fortunate to have found enlightened backers in some pharmaceutical 
companies and also in politics. The parliamentary delegation of the German 
Social  Democratic  Party  (SPD)  –  including  IGH  Advisory  Board  members 
Heidemarie Wieczorek-Zeul and Karin Roth – has officially endorsed the HIF and 
also  initiated  various  important  seminars  on  the  HIF,  including  one  in  the 
European  Parliament  (April  11,  2011)  that  was  sponsored  by  MEP  Norbert 
Neuser  and  attended  by  numerous  prominent  politicians  including  EU 
Commissioner for Development Andris Piebalgs. On the basis of this meeting, we 
expect more outreach to other Social Democratic and Labour Parties in Europe 
as well as to Green Parties which have also shown an interest in the way the 
                                                 
8 Another option would be to fund the HIF through a financial transactions tax, a carbon tax, or a 
global resources dividend. On the latter, (see Pogge 2008, ch. 8). 14 
 
current intellectual property regime burdens the world poor populations. And 
there is considerable political support in other countries as well, including India, 
where former President Dr. A. P. J. Abdul Kalam has become a friend of the HIF, 
addressing our last Innova-P2 meeting there on May 12, 2011.9  
We are currently involved in an effort to win sponsorship for an official side 
event at the UN General Assembly meeting on non -communicable diseases, 
September 18-20, 2011, in New York.  
8. The need for pilots 
The second hurdle is related to the first. Governments will muster the political 
will  to  create  the  HIF  only  if  they  are  convinced  that  it  would  work.  In  this 
regard,  their  main  concern  is  the  measurement  of  health  impact.  Is  it  really 
possible, at reasonable cost, credibly to assess the therapeutic benefits of a new 
medicine in poor and rich countries around the world? The best way to reassure 
governments  and  innovators  on  this  point  is  to  conduct  a  “pilot”  of  the  HIF 
concept. Such a pilot would consist of a contractual arrangement in which a firm 
is rewarded explicitly on the basis of assessed health impact for one product in a 
single jurisdiction. Depending on the size of the jurisdiction and the volume of 
drug sales, a pilot could be run at a relatively low cost.  
A pilot would demonstrate the feasibility of reliable health impact assessment 
and show the effect on behavior of rewarding a firm according to health impact 
rather than through mark-ups. A pilot would also provide practical evidence on 
the best methods for assessing health impact and opportunities to learn how to 
write contracts governing rewards based on health impact. 
In a suitable pilot, a firm would agree to reduce the price of a newly launched (or 
existing) product in one jurisdiction, which could be a city, province, country, or 
region. In exchange, it would receive rewards based on its product’s measured 
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health  impact.  The  incentives  should  be  designed  so  that,  if  the  firm 
appropriately responds to them (enhancing the health impact of its product by 
safeguarding  freshness,  focusing  on  patients  who  benefit  the  most  and 
promoting proper adherence to treatment protocol), its profits would be no less 
than what they would be without the pilot. For example, in the case of an anti-
retroviral (ARV), a firm would receive no reward for patients switched from an 
equally effective ARV, small rewards for patients switched from a less effective 
ARV with greater toxicity and therefore typically lower compliance, and large 
rewards for patients who had previously had no treatment at all. The scheme of 
rewards would be agreed with the firm in advance.  
Our preparations for pilots were concentrated around two major meetings. In 
April 2010, we made substantial progress on the measurement of health impact 
at a collaborative workshop with many health economists and epidemiologists at 
the  National  Institute  for  Health  and  Clinical  Excellence  (NICE)  in  London. 
Concrete pilot possibilities were then discussed at a three-day workshop held in 
May 2011 at  the Rockefeller Foundation’s conference center in Bellagio with 
experts  in  epidemiology, health  economics,  health  outcomes,  and  trial  design 
from Canada, China, Colombia, India, Mexico, South Africa, the UK, the US, and 
Vietnam. The latter Workshop settled on the following five desiderata. 
1.  A pilot must involve a change in practice — ideally in the introduction of a 
new drug or a reduction  in price  — that  has a measurable impact  on 
health.  To  be  measurable,  impact  must  be  substantial  and  capable  of 
being documented with suitable evidence. If the pilot involves a reduction 
in  the  price  of  an  existing  drug,  the  health  impact  may  arise  from 
improved take-up of the drug due to increased volume or due to a shift in 
take-up toward patients who benefit more.  
2.  A  pilot  should  be  cost-effective  from  a  health  or  humanitarian 
perspective, that is, should lead to measurable health improvements at 
reasonable cost. Here it is helpful that, because the rewards paid to the 
firm  are  based  on  assessed  health  benefits,  their  cost-effectiveness  is 16 
 
known in advance. If the firm’s efforts to enhance the health impact of its 
product bear little fruit, the cost of the pilot is correspondingly reduced. 
3.  A pilot must be feasible in a defined area so that its cost can be controlled 
by limiting the territory in which data on health outcomes and drug usage 
must be obtained.  
4.  A  pilot  should  not  undermine  market  competition.  When  a  firm  is 
rewarded for selling at a low price, it may be able to undercut other firms 
in the market. This unfairness should be avoided by ensuring that, if a 
product is already available generically, all firms selling this product are 
offered  the  same  rewards.  Even  if  the  product  is  not  yet  available 
generically, the rewards should be designed so that they do not inhibit 
generic entry in the future. 
5.  To demonstrate the feasibility of the HIF, several pilots should be run. 
There  is  great  international  diversity  in  conditions  relevant  to  health 
impact assessment, including diversity in the availability, reliability and 
cost  of data, in the prevalence of insurance  coverage, in the extent to 
which  medicines  are  supplied  through  the  private  sector,  and  in  the 
extent  to  which  prescriptions  are  required.  Moreover,  medicines 
themselves differ in various important ways, such as mode of action, time 
lag, risk of product deterioration, and importance of compliance. A variety 
of  pilots,  involving  different  medicines  and  diverse  locations,  would 
provide much  better  preparation  for  the  creation  of  the  HIF than  any 
single pilot could. 
Two promising pilot projects have emerged from the Bellagio Workshop, and we 
are now involved in hammering out a specific pilot plan that is acceptable to the 
company whose product is to be marketed in the new way, to the funder(s) of 
the  health  impact  assessments  and  reward  payments,  and  to  the  relevant 
political authorities in the pilot jurisdiction. 17 
 
9. Conclusion: Joining forces for justice in global health 
The current international system for encouraging pharmaceutical innovation is 
highly inefficient because the rewards it offers are only very tenuously related to 
health outcomes (see Pogge 2011a). This system is unsustainable as even the 
wealthiest countries cannot afford skyrocketing health care costs forever. The 
HIF is a concrete proposal for tying cost to therapeutic benefits in the important 
domain of pharmaceutical innovations. The HIF is not cheap, and its creation 
therefore  involves  financial  and  political  risks.  These  risks  can  be  greatly 
reduced  through  appropriate  pilots.  The  paramount  task  now  is  to  gather 
financial and political support for a suitable set of pilots, each of which requires a 
willing firm, a cooperative jurisdiction, funding for the reward payments and 
funding for the health impact assessment. Fortunately, these pilots have their 
own intrinsic value by delivering health improvements at reasonable cost. But 
their potentially much greater value consists in preparing the way for the HIF 
itself  which  could  be  an  amazing  revolution  in  global  health  and  a  concrete 
model  of  a  just  global  institution.  If  it  works  as  expected,  the  medicines  it 
supports would bring enormous health gains, especially in the world’s poorer 
areas, even  while its net  costs would be negligible or (more likely) negative. 
While  funding  the  HIF,  taxpayers  would  save  through  reduced  expenses  on 
public  health  facilities,  foreign  aid,  insurance  premiums  and  private  drug 
purchases.  They  would  save  expenses  for  costly  hospitalizations  averted  by 
timely and effective pharmacological interventions. And they would benefit most 
of  all  from  the  diffuse  economic  effects  of  a  massive  reduction  in  the  global 
burden of disease. Last and foremost, we would have taken an important step 
toward global justice by reducing the artificial exclusion of poor people from the 
fruits of pharmaceutical R&D. We ask politicians and potential funders to help us 
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